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NOTES

legislative regulation through the application of the self-incrimination clause when the reasons behind that clause are
not applicable.
Of late, much opposition has been expressed towards a
tendency to over-extend the privilege by many courts. In
many instances the primary purpose of the privilege, to protect the innocent from official oppression, has been overlooked.4 3 Apparently in the Shapiro case a majority of the
Supreme Court felt that the reasons behind the privilege were
not strong enough to outweigh the interest in efficient regulation. 4" The courts should prevent a continued abuse of the
privilege against self-incrimination by uniting to keep it
"strictly within the limits dictated by historic fact, cool reason45
ing, and sound policy."

TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES
THE EXTENSION OF TRADE NAME PROTECTION
TO NON-COMPETITIVE AREAS
Triangle Publications held a registered trade-mark
"Seventeen" under which it published a fashion magazine
appealing to teen-age girls. Shortly after this name was
registered, Rohrlich and others began marketing girdles under the trade-name "Miss Seventeen."
Triangle Publications sought to enjoin the use of the word "Seventeen" and
asked for an accounting, alleging both statutory trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition. The federal district
court enjoined the use of the word "Seventeen" on the ground
that such use constituted unfair competition and allowed an
accounting. In so ruling, the court found that "Seventeen"
had acquired secondary meaning through Triangle's advertis43. "In the past generation and especially in a few Courts, this
practical difference of effect is plainly apparent; for, under the guise
of reasoning and interpretation, the privilege has by them, in a spirit
of implicit favor, been so extended in application beyond its previous

limits as almost to be incredible, certainly to defy common sense." 8
WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940); See also 7 BENTHAM,
RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 452 (Bowring ed. 1843); STEPHEN,

HISTORY OF THE CRImINAL LAW 342, 441, 535, 542, 565 (1883); Wigmore, Nemo Tenetur Seipsum Pr'odere, 5 HARV. L. REV. 71, 86 (1891).
44. See, Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 56 YALE
L. J.1111 (1947).
45. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d ed. 1940).
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ing and publication and was thereby entitled to protection.'

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction but denied the accounting since Triangle was unable to
prove any damage. Judge Frank dissented. Triangle Publications v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1948).
This holding appears to be the second in which a federal court of appeals has granted trade-mark protection un-

der the unfair competition

doctrine because

consumers

may possibly believe that the trade-mark owner endorsed
2
the product of the subsequent user.

An appreciation of the function of the trade-mark is

essential to an evaluation of the need for protection.3 The
primary function of the mark is to identify a product and
designate it as from a particular source. 4 While serving this

purpose the mark assumes secondary significance as a symbol
1. Judicial protection of a trade-mark is not dependent upon the
fact of registration, for registration does not itself confer title upon
the registrant if some other person by prior adoption and use has
acquired a common law interest in the same mark. Delbeck & Die,
Societe A Responsibilite Limites v. Monica, 10 F. Supp. 1013 (E. D.
N. Y. 1935); Thomas G. Carroll & Son Co. v. Mcllvaine & Baldwin,
171 Fed. 125 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1909), aff'd, 183 F.2d 22 (2d Cir.
1910).
Common law protection on theory of unfair competition is
merited only if the mark is "fanciful" or "suggestive," not "descriptive." Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 143 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S. 766 (1944); Lusta-Foame Co. v. William
Filene's Sons Co., 66 F. Supp. 517 (D. Mass. 1946); Pennzoil Co. v.
Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 50 F. Supp. 891 (D. Md. 1943),
aff'd, 140 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1944). Courts will also afford protection
when they consider the mark to have acquired a secondary meaning.
N. S. W. Co. v. Wholesale Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 123 F.2d 38 (6th
Cir. 1941). The court in the present case found the word "Seventeen" had not only acquired a secondary meaning with respect to
Triangle's magazine, but that it was a "fanciful" word such as would
merit common law protection. 167 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1948).
2. The first case so held was Hanson v. Triangle Publications,
Inc., 163 F.2d 74 (8th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 855 (1948)
in which the trade-mark "Seventeen" was first protected from appropriation. In an earlier case the manufacturer of pocket knives
was enjoined from using the word "Scout" to identify his product
since consumers might be led to believe that the knives were endorsed
by the Boy Scouts of America. That organization, however, unlike
Triangle Publications, was in the habit of endorsing knives, thus
giving additional grounds for confusion. Adolph Kastor and Bros.,
Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm., 138 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1943).
3. For a comprehensive treatment of this subject see Callmann,
Unfair Competition Without Competition, 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 443
(1947); Goble, Where and What a Trade-Mark Protects, 22 ILLr. L.

Rsv. 379 (1927).

4. J. S. Tyree, Chemist v. Thymo Borine Laboratory, 151 F.2d
621 (7th Cir. 1945); American Broadcasting Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d
412 (2d Cir. 1941).
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of the manufacturer's good will.r In protecting the trademark in its identification capacity the courts have long
recognized the desirability of enabling the consumer to distinguish between products and to rely upon their source.
Only in recent years, however, has there been any indication
that the good will of the manufacturer is entitled to protection.
Recognizing that the public interest controls the application of the unfair competition doctrine, the courts have
required that consumer confusion result from the unfair
activities of the subsequent trade-mark user if the owner is
to be entitled to protection. In judging whether confusion
between products existed, the courts have had difficulty
establishing workable standards because the concept of "confusion" has expanded with changes in commercial practices.6 At the turn of the century when communication
facilities were limited, trade-marks had only local significance because the buyer was in a position personally to ascertain the identity and source of his purchases. The improbability of confusion confined trade-mark protection to
instances where the subsequent user manufactured goods
which were in direct competition with those of the owner.7
As the means of communication were improved and extended, and there arose the phenomenon of nation-wide advertising and selling, the consumer could no longer rely upon
personal knowledge in determining the character of goods
purchased. The increased dependence of the consumer upon
advertising brought to the courts a realization that the
former limits of protection were insufficient to fulfill trademark purposes. At this point the "confusion of source"
doctrine made its appearance. In its origin this concept
encompassed only goods with similar physical properties.
Thus, shovels were held to be of the same descriptive class
5. Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316 U.
S.203 (1942). See Brown, Advertising and the Public InMterest: Legal
Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165 (1948).

6. "There is no part of the law which is more plastic than unfair
competition." Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604
(2d Cir. 1925).

7. "The phrase 'unfair competition' presupposes competition of
some sort. In the absence of competition the doctrine cannot be invoked." Borden Ice Cream Co. v. Borden's Condensed Milk Co., 201
Fed. 510, 514 (7th Cir. 1912).
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as hatchets." The next step was to embrace dissimilar goods
which nevertheless suggested each other. Since automobiles
and tires, though not of the same descriptive class, suggested
one another, trade-names identifying automobiles were protected from tire manufacturers. 9 Further judicial expansion led to the modern view of "confusion of source," under
which the test is: Are the subsequent user's goods of such
a nature as would reasonably lead the public to believe they
were manufactured or distributed by the trade-mark owner. 0
Applying this test, the courts have found likelihood of such
confusion between refrigerators and electrical household appliances," clocks and electric razors, 12 and fountain pens
and razor blades. 3 Under these decisions the underlying
requirement for protection has been probable consumer confusion.
The growth of trade-mark protection, then, may be
diagrammed as four concentric circles, the innermost circle
representing the area of direct competition and the outer
fringe illustrating the inclusion of products which might
reasonably relate back to the same source. Very recently,
8. The Collins Co. v. Oliver Ames & Sons Corp., 18 Fed. 561
(1882). The following cases held certain products to be in the same
descriptive class: Carroll v. Ertheiler, 1 Fed. 688 (1880) (cigarettes
and pipe tobacco); American Tobacco Co. v. Polacsek, 170 Fed. 117
(1909) (cigarettes and chewing tobacco); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Budweiser Malt Products Corp., 295 Fed. 306 (2d Cir. 1943) (beer
and malt extract). The following held the designated products not
to be of the same class: Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Mills Co.,
132 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1943) (milk and tea or coffee); Consumers
Petroleum Co. v. Consumers Co. of Illinois, 169 F.2d 153 (7th Cir.
1948) (fuel oil and coal).
9. Hudson Motor Car Co. v. Hudson Tire Co., 21 F.2d 453 (1927);
Akron-Overland Tire Co. v. Willys-Overland Co., 273 Fed. 674 (3d
Cir. 1921). Similarly, in the following cases one product was held
to suggest the other: Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247
Fed. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) (pancakes and syrup); William A. Rogers,
Ltd. v. Majestic Products Corp., 23 F.2d 219 (1927) (silverware and
silver polish); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Elliot, 7 F.2d 962 (3d Cir.
1925) (men's suits and men's hats).
10. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934).
"It is confusion of origin, not confusion of goods, which controls."
Vick Chemical Co. v. Vick Medicine Co., 8 F.2d 49, 52 (S. D. Ga.
1924), aff'd, 11 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1926). See DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK
PROTECTION AND UNFAIR TRADING § 34 (1936); NIMs, UNFAIR CoIPETITION AND TRADE-MARxs § 221h (4th ed. 1947).

11. Landers, Frary & Clark v. Universal Cooler Corporation, 85
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1936).
12. Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Razor Corporation, 25 F. Supp.
886 (N. D. Ill. 1938).
13. L. E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1934).
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however, there has been a break away from the traditional
"confusion" theory of protection. Some jurisdictions seem
to recognize as an additional ground for this protection the
interest of the manufacturer in the good will he has gained
through use of the trade-mark. 14 The injury which the
courts here undertake to alleviate is the decreased value of
advertising, identification, and reputation to one manufacturer when a second adopts a similar trade-mark and
capitalizes on its previously established merit. 15 This view
has been referred to as the concept of "dilution."' 16 If this
has been the real basis for protection in these eases, however,
the courts have been hesitant so to declare, as is evidenced
by a continued reliance in their opinions upon notions of confusion. Where the confusion is thus rendered less than substantial by the remote relation between the old and new
products, the protection has been justified on extraneous
grounds, as by emphasizing the fraudulent or unfair intention
of the newcomer in adopting the trade-mark. 17 As confusion
has become increasingly improbable, the courts and judges
have experienced proportionally greater difficulty in achieving agreement.' 8 In opposition to the extension of trade-mark
protection to areas of improbable consumer confusion it is
argued that the doctrines of trade mark protection, though
directed toward public benefit, have inherent within them
seeds of economic monopoly. 9 It is said that where pro14. Kay Jewelry Co. v. Kapiloff, 49 S. E.2d 19 (Ga. 1948); Lady
Esther v. Lady Esther Corset Shoppe, 317 Ill. App. 451 (1943); Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 264 N. Y. S. 459 (1923).
15. "The real injury... 'is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or
name by its use upon non-competing goods."' Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc., 264 N. Y. S. 459, 462 (1932), aff'd, 262 N. Y.
482, 188 N. E. 30 (1933).
16. 44 ILL. L. REV. 182, 185 (1949).
17. Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir.
1924), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 706 (1926).
The court stressed the
obvious fraudulent intent of the defendant which manifested itself
when he appropriated not only the name "Vogue," but also the peculiar
"V-Girl" mark which iaentified the magazine.
Similar findings of
fraudulent intent prompted the court to give injunctive relief to the
publishers of Esquire magazine when the defendant tavern owner, in
addition to naming his bar "Esquire," decorated the walls with drawings of Esky, a cartoon character used to identify Esquire magazine,
and reproduced the magazine cover in his decorations. Esquire, Inc.
v. Esquire Bai, 37 F. Supp. 875 (S. D. Fla. 1941).
18. Judge Frank, in his dissent, suggests that the Supreme Court
should review the decision because of a disagreement among the
Courts of Appeal, 167 F.2d 969, 974 (1948).
19. "But the legal protection of trade-names does not engender
competition; on the contrary, it creates lawful monopolies, immunities
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tection is conferred the association of the mark with the
product of the owner becomes more indelibly impressed on
the consumer's mind and the manufacturer's position in the
industry is thereby strengthened. If protection is extended
,beyond the limits of probable confusion the mark comes
to symbolize only one product, giving to the manufacturer
a great economic advantage in both advertising and expansion. 20 When a prospective producer is confronted with such
a situation, he is usually discouraged from entering the
industry and the original manufacturer may gain virtually
complete control over the business he selects, subject only
to the antitrust laws.2' The validity of this argument has
not been successfully refuted, but its significance in the
Seventeen type case may be doubted. The real encouragement to monopoly is given when protection is afforded
against

directly

competing

products. 22

The

trade-mark

"Lucky Strike" discourages any prospective cigarette manufacturer, but future automobile or processed foods producers
are little influenced in their course of action by the pre-eminence of "Lucky Strike." As the relation between the products
becomes more remote, the protection given the trade-mark
becomes less a menace to a competitive economy. Though
its tendency to foster monopoly presents the strongest obstruction to trade-mark protection in the area of directly
competing goods, it is in this area that the courts have
from competition. And the legally forbidden invasions of those
monopolies might often benefit consumers." Judge Frank, dissenting
in Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 957
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 758 (1943). See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57
YALE L. J. 1165 (1948); Borchard, Are Trade-Marks an Anti-Trust
Problem? 31 GEo. L. J. 245 (1943).
20. "The art of advertising spuriously reinforced a genuine demand
by the power of reiterated suggestion." Learned Hand, in Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 Fed. 960, 962 (2d Cir. 1918).
Also see Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection
of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L. J. 1165, 1183 (1948): "For the individual firm, however, it is a potent device to distinguish a product
from its competitors, and to create a partial immunity from the chills
and fevers of competition. The result of successful differentiation is
higher prices than would otherwise prevail. The aim, not always
achieved, is higher profits."
21. Taggart, Trade-Marks: Monopoly or Competition?, 43 Micu. L.
REv. 659, 661 (1945).
Borchard, Are Trade-Marks an Anti-Trust
Problem?, 31 GEo. L. 3. 245 (1943).
22. Judge Frank, concurring in Standard Brands v. Smidler, 151
F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1945), presents a strong argument against any type
of trade-mark protection.
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unanimously found the public interest in prevention of confusion to outweigh the threat to a competitive economy. In
the Seventeen type case the danger of monopoly inducement
is as remote as the possibility of confusion, and the questionable conduct of the subsequent registrant, as well as the
desirability of fair business practices, may be of sufficient
weight to throw the balance in favor of protection.
Another objection to these recent extensions, one which
is particularly pertinent where the trade-mark owner is unable to show damage, 23 is that once the element of probable
consumer confusion is absent, protection represents a paternalistic attitude toward business on the part of the
judiciary. 2 It is contended that there is no injustice in allowing a newcomer to take advantage of the good will of an
already established product where there is no possibility of
confusion.25 But even where no injury can be shown, this
argument does not seem sufficiently persuasive to compel
a denial of protection. One may question whether the newcomer will gain any benefit from using a similar trade-mark
in the absence of some confusion between the two products.
Though it is apparent that the prior registrant has been
required to prove less to be entitled to protection, this does
not seem unjust in the absence of a corresponding increase
in the risks of monopoly. It is rational that the self-developed
interest of the original manufacturer in his good will should
be given preference over the unfair and unethical intentions
and practices of the newcomer in usurping the benefits of
such reputation.2 6 And it is not unreasonable to assume that
23. The inability of Triangle to show actual or probable injury is

stressed by Judge Frank in his dissent. 167 F.2d 969, 981 (2d Cir.
1948).
24. "Since the present-day rationale of trade-name protection is
such actual or probable confusion of source as to injure ... plaintiff's

good will, then,

. .

.a plaintiff seeking such protection should always

requirement. .

. But, if the frontiers of trade-name protection are

be required to prove that defendant's product is so substandard that,
associated by consumers with plaintiff, impairment of plaintiff's
if...
good will is a likely result. As yet courts have not imposed such a
.

to be enlarged to include an extraordinary case like this, then, at a
minimum, such proof should be exacted." 167 F.2d 969, 981 (2d Cir.
1948), Judge Frank, dissenting.
25. Judge Frank, dissenting in the present case, said: "Nor would
the automobile manufacturer be entitled to an injunction against the
candy-maker merely because the latter deliberately chose the name, intending to acquire advantages accruing to him from the elaborate advertising of the Cadillac." 167 F.2d 969, 978 (2d Cir. 1948).
26. "It is so easy for the honest business man, who wishes to sell
his goods upon their merits, to select from the entire material universe,

582
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the desire for a competitive economy carries within it an
27
idea of fair competition.

which is before him, symbols, marks, and coverings which by no possibility can cause confusion between his goods and those of competitors,
that the courts look with suspicion upon one who, in dressing his goods
for the market, approaches so near to his successful rival that the public
may fail to distinguish between them." Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd
Co., 178 Fed. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910).
This passage is quoted in Vick
Chemical Co. v. Vick Medicine Co., 8 F.2d 49, 52 (S. D. Ga. 1925).
27. ". . . there is no fetish in the word 'competition.'
The invocation of equity rests more vitally on the unfairness."
Vogue Co. v.
Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509, 513 (6th Cir. 1924), cert. denied,
273 U. S. 706 (1926).

